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DECEMBER  
2025

# Safety MATTERS

Providing the Namibian aviation industry and users with vital information on the latest aviation safety statistics and reports for the continuous improvement of safety systems:

Share Knowledge = Improve Safety





This monthly publication keeps industry, NCAA licence holders, and the general public informed of safety-related occurrences, recommendations, and initiatives within the industry. All reports are de-identified and no attempt should be made to identify the reporter in this or any other avenue unless specific authorisation is given.

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Safety data trending is essential in aviation safety. Only with adequate data on proactive and reactive mechanisms, can we move towards prediction. By analysing key events and processes through appropriate metrics, we can move closer to achieving maximum safety levels and minimising undesirable events.

## December 2025

There were 52 occurrence reports in December, a significant increase from this period in previous years, given it is traditionally a quieter month. Reports included:

- 22 mandatory events, and of the 30 voluntary reports there were 2 hazard reports. The running total is 30.8% voluntary, 9.0% hazard, 60.2% mandatory.
- 20 medium-risk events, including 11 bird strikes, and no high-risk events, resulting in a reduction to 1.6% high risk, 21.5% medium risk, and 76.9% low risk.
- There were no accidents in December, while three events sustained minor damage.



Detailed information is available in the occurrence section, and trends will be reviewed by the State Safety Programme Steering Committee (SSP Steercom) and the SSP Technical Working Group (TWG)

For more information about classifications of risk, see the definitions in Safety Bulletin 1-22. Graphs included in this document show 12-month rolling figures unless specified.

# Safety Statistics

## Year-end Self-Assessment

The SSP Safety Performance is tracked on a calendar-year basis, so December is a chance to reflect and measure where we are at, where we planned to be, and where we want to be in the future.

Aside from the HRC SPIs, the NASP monitors several other parameters, and these are reported on in the table below. The year-end shows that we achieved over 65% of our non-HRC SPIs. While only 3 of the 7 HRC SPIs were achieved (see page 5), many were only slightly above target, and it is noted categories include precursors and hazards.

Year-end figures will be used to develop the NASP for 2026-2028, planned for publication early 2026.

SPT#	Details	Target 2025	Actual 2025
1.1.1	Accident rate	0.143	0.142
1.1.2	Fatal Accidents	1.000*	1.000
<i>This has been changed from a rate to a number for more effective monitoring, the target for 2026 will be zero.</i>			
1.1.3	Accident rate in scheduled air transport	0.000	0.000
1.2.1	Mandatory incident rate	4.365	3.581
1.4.1	Voluntary occurrence rate	5.400	7.954
1.3.1	Hazard report rate	0.724	1.029
	Average HRC Rate per category	0.436	0.611
	Overall HRC	4.414	4.275
2.1.1	USOAP Effective Implementation	75%	73%
2.1.2	USOAP Self Assessment	75%	79.7%
2.1.3	USOAP CAPs accepted	65%	93%
2.1.4	Level of Compliance with the SARPs	92.26%	80.76%
3.1.1	Percentage of foundational PQs completed	76%	67.09%
3.1.2	Maturity Level of SSP	Present and effective	New PQs applied
3.1.3	USOAP Safety Index	1.21	1.210
3.1.4	Percentage of completion of SSP Implementation Plan	90%	74%
3.1.5	Percentage of Service Providers with implemented SMS	100%	95%
3.1.5	Percentage of Service Providers with accepted SMS	100%	73%

# Safety Dashboard

# Safety Performance Indicators December 2025

There were 3 loss of separation precursor events (including one hazard report) and one runway excursion in December. The high number of bird strikes, mainly at FYWH (Windhoek International) is discussed on page 8.



Key Safety Areas Numbers - Rate per 1000 departures, 2025								
AVG rate	0.610	2	3	4	5	6	7	
OVRL Rate	4.270	AirProx/LOS	CFIT	Rwy Excurs.	Wildlife	LOCI	Rwy Incurs.	Maint & Tech
51221 12 mth avg	0.363	0.062	0.082	1.460	0.144	0.133	2.026	
3914 JAN '25	0.000	0.255	0.000	1.533	0.000	0.000	1.277	
3622 FEB '25	0.000	0.276	0.276	1.104	0.828	0.276	1.380	
3988 MAR '25	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.505	0.000	0.000	5.767	
4398 APR '25	0.455	0.000	0.000	2.956	0.000	0.000	1.819	
4357 MAY '25	0.689	0.000	0.230	1.377	0.459	0.000	1.377	
4180 JUN '25	0.718	0.000	0.000	1.196	0.000	0.239	1.914	
4383 JUL '25	0.228	0.000	0.000	0.913	0.000	0.000	1.825	
4591 AUG '24	0.436	0.218	0.000	1.307	0.000	0.218	1.960	
4478 SEP '25	0.223	0.000	0.223	0.893	0.223	0.223	1.117	
4654 OCT '25	0.430	0.000	0.000	0.645	0.215	0.430	1.934	
4686 NOV '25	0.427	0.000	0.000	1.067	0.000	0.213	1.921	
3970 DEC '25	0.756	0.000	0.252	3.023	0.000	0.000	2.015	
Target 2025	0.248	0.123	0.111	1.454	0.099	0.112	1.958	
Avg 2024	0.269	0.116	0.148	1.151	0.038	0.018	2.823	
SD 2024	0.295	0.201	0.167	1.043	0.086	0.060	1.318	
Three of Alert 3	0.564	0.317	0.314	2.195	0.125	0.078	4.141	
Two of Alert 2	0.860	0.518	0.481	3.238	0.211	0.137	5.459	
One of Alert 1	1.155	0.720	0.647	4.282	0.298	0.197	6.777	



## Safety Thought for the Month

*"If you stop learning, your accident risk will increase exponentially, when you feel there is nothing left to learn - stop."*

- Anon

*Stay Safe!*

# Reporting

From the ED's Desk:

*Toska Sem*  
Executive Director



Dear Stakeholders,

As we conclude and reflect on the month of December 2025, I would like to take this opportunity to briefly review key developments during the closing weeks of the year and to extend my best wishes to the aviation community as we prepare to enter 2026.

December traditionally presents a mixed bag of operational activity, tourist travel, particularly on the coast, increases, while personal pressures to wrap up operational commitments and enable family time also increase. Throughout the month, industry stakeholders demonstrated professionalism and vigilance in managing these demands, ensuring continuity of safe and secure operations. Safety oversight activities conducted during December confirmed continued compliance with regulatory requirements, including certification of our two international airports, while also reinforcing the importance of strict adherence to procedures during high-tempo operations.

Seeing the momentum of the year maintained through the holidays in the number of safety occurrences, hazards, and operational events reported during the month served as a positive reminder of the maturing safety culture and a shared commitment to learning and improvement rather than attribution of blame. Demonstrating with clarity that the safety consciousness was not on holiday, even while our offices were closed.



December also marked a period of consolidation, with several safety and security initiatives transitioning from planning to implementation, providing a strong foundation as we move into the new year. The focus on safety intelligence, proactive risk identification and inter-agency coordination will remain central to our oversight priorities in 2026.

On behalf of the Namibia Civil Aviation Authority, I wish the entire aviation industry a safe, secure and prosperous 2026. I look forward to continued collaboration as we collectively strengthen aviation safety and security for the benefit of Namibia and the region.

***Yours in safety, Ms. Toska Sem***

# SMS - WHAT TO WORK ON?

The whole point of our SDCPS is to establish what to work on. With safety performance indicators we aim to hyper focus the needs of our SMS and make data-driven decisions. Your SPIs may not update in January, but the new year can be a chance to institute a review - see if you are measuring all the right things, see how far you are progressing or where you need to concentrate more effort.



SPIs require a minimum of annual updates, which may coincide with the annual SMS Manual updates, or your annual certificate renewal audit. The reason for a minimum of annual is that it forces you to assess and improve. Indicators that are either 100% (leading) or 0% (lagging) can be removed since they have been achieved - pat yourself on the back! Trending on indicators that are not achieved can help management to allocate expenditure in the areas of weakness.

Indicators that did not reach their aiming point, especially those that did not make a measurable effect, or that had a negative effect, are those areas that you can focus your attention on. Increase training, revise SOPs, ensure cross-checking of procedures is applied consistently, promote hazard identification, as identified by your data. Raise the issues at your safety action group for brainstorming sessions on how to address the challenges. Consider elevation or the outcomes from the SAG to the safety review board, where applicable.

Your SDCPS is a living organism that feeds on information. When you feed it with the right information, and in sufficient quantity, you will get the right answers, to maximise resources to areas of maximum safety gains, helping your organisation thrive.

So - wondering what to work on this year? Let your SMS tell you.

Finally, as always, remember, for incident and hazard reporting, email both [incidents@ncaa.na](mailto:incidents@ncaa.na) and [daaii@mwt.gov.na](mailto:daaii@mwt.gov.na); for voluntary or anonymous reports, follow the [Confidential Reporting Link](#).



# SAFETY OCCURRENCES

DECEMBER 2025



## WILDLIFE STRIKES (VOLUNTARY, **MEDIUM RISK**, AGA)

There were twelve wildlife events reported this month, eleven bird encounters and one squirrel encounter. The unprecedented abundance of seeds, flowers, and fruits this year may be a causal factor in the increase. Pilots should be vigilant and refer to the November 2025 edition of Safety Matters for additional guidance.

Wildlife	Events and near misses		
No.	AD	Phase	Details
6	FYWH	Takeoff	Falcon, Bird unknown
5	FYWH	Landing	Bird unknown
1	FYWE	Landing	Squirrels

The table below shows rates of bird and wildlife reports per 1000 movements.

YEAR	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUNE	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
2025	1.533	1.104	1.505	2.956	1.148	0.957	0.913	1.377	0.447	0.645	1.067	3.023	61
2024	2.042	3.941	0.000	1.615	1.106	0.599	1.799	1.131	0.464	0.431	3.941	0.000	67
2023	1.346	0.823	1.398	0.696	0.623	0.966	0.471	0.438	0.525	1.192	1.116	1.538	42
2022	0.846	0.739	1.126	1.272	1.308	2.350	1.877	0.219	0.250	0.679	0.684	1.925	50
2021	2.864	7.380	8.123	2.052	3.745	4.223	0.000	2.778	0.000	1.855	0.835	0.000	74

# SAFETY OCCURRENCES

DECEMBER 2025



## TECHNICAL FAULTS (MANDATORY, **LOW RISK**, AIR/OPS)

There were six technical events reported this month, including one engine failure and one partial engine failure, detailed on page 13. There was a fuel leak detailed on page 18. Other events were addressed as per the aircraft flight manual (AFM) without incident.

No.	Fault	Type
1	Engine failure (see page 13)	Piston
1	Partial engine failure (see page 13)	Piston
1	Low fuel pressure	Piston
1	Fuel cap leaking (see page 18)	Turbine
1	Flap warning	Turbine
1	Crossfeed fault	Turbine

AMO personnel are again reminded of the critical importance of the elements in NAMCATS Part 140 Appendix A, for identification of trends that an individual AMO may not pick up, and it provides closure to the trends. AMOs, ATOs, AOCs, always ensure to submit the closure report by the AMO when there is a technical event, either via the PRAM or directly from the AMO.

# SAFETY OCCURRENCES

DECEMBER 2025



## ATS / A-MET RELATED EVENTS (MANDATORY, **LOW RISK**, ANSSO)

The following 9 Air Traffic Services and Meteorological events occurred.

No.	Fault	Area
1	No MET officer	FYWB
1	No TAF issued	FYWH
2	MET equipment failures	FYWB, FYOA
1	No estimates passed	FNLU
1	Radar fault (telecom fibre failure)	FYWF
1	Copperchase fault (no flight plans)	FYWH
1	AFTN fault	FYWH
1	Late for duty without notification	FYWH

# SAFETY OCCURRENCES

DECEMBER 2025



## AERODROME RELATED EVENTS (HAZARD, **LOW RISK**, AGA)

An unlit object was reported in the vicinity of FYOA (Ondangwa) airport.

*NCAA is looking into this matter.*

A number of airport scales were reported as uncalibrated.

*It was concluded that determining baggage and passenger weights is an operator responsibility and thus it is essential for operators to have an SLA with the airport if they require the use of calibrated equipment.*

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# SAFETY OCCURRENCES

DECEMBER 2025



## GO AROUNDS AND DIVERSION EVENTS (VOLUNTARY, **LOW RISK**, OPS/ANSSO)

The following table shows go-around and diversion events.

No.	Details	Intended
2	Go arounds due to unstable approach	FYWH
2	Go arounds due to wildlife	FYWE, FYWH
7	Diversions due to weather	FYOG, FYAS, FYME, FYLZ, FYWE, FYWH, FYMO
1	Diversion due to VIP	FYTF

The summer weather continues to bring with it many weather diversions. For VFR day only operators, always err on the side of caution when making weather decisions. For all IFR commercial flights, a functional weather radar or equivalent device is required. Your passengers do not want you to take unnecessary risks with their safety.

# SAFETY OCCURRENCES

DECEMBER 2025

## ENGINE FAILURE (MANDATORY, MEDIUM RISK, OPS/AIR)

A non-type certified aircraft suffered an engine failure, resulting in a forced landing on a farm. The pilot sustained no injuries, the aircraft suffered minor damage.

*DAAll is investigating.*

## PRECAUTIONARY LANDING (MANDATORY, MEDIUM RISK, OPS/AIR)

En route from FYWE (Eros) to FYSM (Swakopmund) low level, the pilot noticed significant fuel flow fluctuations and this was followed by power surges. Fault finding with fuel, mixture, magnetos, did not resolve the problem and the pilot elected to land on a road. The forced landing was completed successfully.

*DAAll was notified and an engineer was sent out to the landing site. A ferry approval along with an approval to takeoff from a road was obtained from NCAA emergency contacts during office closure. The reason for the surge is not available at this point. The pilot is commended for taking swift action before the event escalated into an engine failure.*

## LOSS OF SEPARATION (MANDATORY, MEDIUM RISK, OPS)

A trainer called final approach at 2nm and was already configured for landing when an NTCA overflew the trainer at less than 100ft horizontal and vertical separation. The pilot of the NTCA never requested the manoeuvre, but announced crossing over traffic from left and above, then proceeded to land. The manoeuvre forced the trainer to slow to the minimum approach speed to establish separation.

*OPS is investigating. Traffic in the circuit are reminded to always adhere to the right of way rules. A lower aircraft and an aircraft on final have right of way.*

# SAFETY OCCURRENCES

DECEMBER 2025

## GROUND COLLISION (MANDATORY, MEDIUM RISK, OPS/AGA)

After landing on the secondary runway the pilot proceeded to taxi to the parking bays via the main runway. While turning from the secondary runway to the main runway, the aircraft hit the windsock pole with the leading edge of the wing, resulting in severe damage to the wing.

DAAll is investigating.

*While the causes are not yet identified, pilots are reminded that to avoid ground collisions taxi speed should be at a slow walking pace, particularly in an unfamiliar airfield. When approaching the exit of a runway and speed is high, continue and backtrack.*



## REJECTED TAKEOFF (MANDATORY, MEDIUM RISK, OPS)

An aircraft rejected takeoff after failing to reach the required speed at a pre-determined point along the runway. This resulted in a slight overshoot of the runway surface into the brush at the end. No damage was sustained.

*It is always better to reject a takeoff - potentially resulting in a ground collision, than get airborne with insufficient speed, which would likely result in a catastrophic LOC-I event. The pilot is commended for decision making.*

# SAFETY OCCURRENCES

DECEMBER 2025

## DOUBLE JACK FAILURE (MANDATORY, **MEDIUM RISK**, AIR)

An AMO reported substantial damage to the underside of an aircraft when a double main jack failure occurred and the aircraft slid off the jacks during work on the undercarriage.

*DAAll is investigating.*

## BRAKE CALIPER INCORRECTLY INSTALLED (VOLUNTARY, **LOW RISK**, AIR)

On a post-maintenance inspection by the engineer, it was discovered that the brake caliper back plate and bolts were missing.

*The service provider is investigating the event as per their SMS with respect to root cause.*



# SAFETY OCCURRENCES


DECEMBER 2025

## GLIDER TRAFFIC (HAZARD, MEDIUM RISK, OPS/ANSSO)

Two reports were received about the hazard of the increasing number of gliders in the South of Windhoek. The reporter raised the issue with respect to the also busy Windhoek-Sossusvlei route. Establishment of a VFR route was suggested.

*NCAA has made contact with SSN for an upcoming discussion about the conflict on this route. There is a possibility of making a route, which would require mandatory communication prior to crossing or approaching.*

*See more about gliders in the November edition of Safety Matters, keep a good lookout, avoid areas of high convection, and remember where one glider is circling there are normally more.*



# SAFETY OCCURRENCES

DECEMBER 2025

## AIRSPACE INFRINGEMENT (MANDATORY, MEDIUM RISK, OPS/ANSSO)

A glider was observed by ATC in the Windhoek TMA without a clearance.

*SSN conducted an investigation and it was discovered that unfamiliarity with the navigation system caused the pilot to make a positional error - mistaking the WHV 50 DME circle for the 60 DME circle.*

*The pilot received a comprehensive briefing on the navigation system and the Namibian airspace. Additionally, the daily briefing has been strengthened to reinforce the aspect of airspace utilization with regard to the daily meteorological situation*

## RECKLESS USE OF A VEHICLE ON THE AIRSIDE (MANDATORY, MEDIUM RISK, AGA)

An unauthorised driver took an airside vehicle to drive from a service area to the main terminal in the rain. The driver lost control of the vehicle, damaging the fuel emergency stop, signage, and the passenger walkway.

*This is a serious safety concern and appropriate enforcement action will follow if the report is confirmed to be accurate. Airports are recommended to ensure regular safety briefings and trending on undesirable behaviour for optimum airside safety. All airside personnel should have comprehensive security vetting. Vehicles should never be left unattended without security locks, and keys must be guarded.*



# SAFETY OCCURRENCES

DECEMBER 2025

## FUEL CAP LEAKING (MANDATORY, **LOW RISK**, OPS/AIR)

During the climb out, the crew noticed fuel vapour coming from the right tip tank fuel cap. They stopped transfer as a precaution and continued the climb. The vapour appeared to have stopped and they resumed fuel transfer, however, the fuel did not transfer as normal on the right side. As a precaution they landed in FYOG (Oranjemund) and refuelled where they checked the fuel cap and the quantity of fuel consumed against that expected. There was no significant difference, therefore, they continued to FACT (Cape Town).

The remainder of the flight, there was no further evidence of fuel leaks. The crew elected to stay overnight, where the aircraft could be checked, no fault was found, and the crew returned without further event.



*It is always better to err on the cautious side when it comes to fuel faults. See also the August edition of Safety Matters for a fuel related event that nearly caused a catastrophic result.*

## OPERATION OUTSIDE HOURS OF DUTY (MANDATORY, **LOW RISK**, OPS/AGA/ANSSO)

An aircraft operated into and out of an airport outside the scheduled hours of duty. Investigation by the reporter revealed that the NOTAM'd hours were not correct - which was most likely the cause of the incident.

*The airport operator is addressing quality issues with respect to issuance of NOTAMs.*

# SAFETY OCCURRENCES

DECEMBER 2025


## MEDICAL EMERGENCY (VOLUNTARY, **LOW RISK**, OPS)

An airliner declared a medical emergency, medical services were contacted and met the passenger on arrival.

## LIGHTNING STRIKE (MANDATORY, **LOW RISK**, OPS)

An aircraft suffered a lightning strike en route to FYWH (Windhoek International). The pilots assessed the damage and it appeared there were no systems affected, nor the powerplant, a decision was made to continue to FYWE whereupon the AMO checked the aircraft for damage and none was found.

*Lightning strikes can have severe effects, not just on avionics, but they can cause engine bearing damage, or a flameout due to disturbance of the air flow for jets. They can also damage control surfaces. Be aware of the dangers when flying in CB activity.*





# Read/Hear Backs

Pilot's read-back must be complete and clear to ensure a complete and correct understanding by the controller.

The action of reading back a clearance **gives the controller an opportunity to confirm that the message has been correctly received, and if necessary, to correct any errors.**



Standard phraseology **reduces the risk that a message will be misunderstood and aids the read-back/hear-back process so that any error is quickly detected.** Ambiguous or non-standard phraseology is a frequent causal or contributory factor in aircraft accidents and incidents


An uncorrected erroneous read-back (known as a hear-back error) may lead to a deviation from the intended clearance and may not be detected until the controller observes the deviation on his/her situational display.



The flight crew must read back to the air traffic controller safety-related parts of ATC clearances and instructions. The following items must always be read back:



- Route clearance
- Holding instructions
- Any route and holding point specified in a taxi clearance
- Any clearances, conditional clearances or instructions must be read back or acknowledged in a manner to clearly indicate that they have been understood and will be complied with.
- Approach clearances
- Altimeter settings
- SSR codes
- Level instructions/restriction.
- Runway in use
- Heading and Speed instructions
- Clearances and instructions to enter, land on, take off from, hold short of, cross or backtrack on any runway



Read-back of a clearance should never be replaced by the use of terms such as "Roger", "Wilco" or "Copied". Likewise, a controller should not use similar terms to acknowledge a message requiring a definite answer (e.g. acknowledging a pilot's statement that an altitude or speed restriction cannot be met).

**The controller must listen to the read-back to ascertain that the clearance or instruction has been correctly acknowledged by the flight crew and shall take immediate action to correct any discrepancies revealed by the read-back.**

# SAFETY FEEDBACK

DECEMBER 2025

## MOKUTI FREQUENCY (HAZARD, MEDIUM RISK, ANSSO/OPS)

Ongoing investigations are underway in terms of reassignment of the Mokuti frequency. A safety case is being developed and those with input on the matter should contact SSPQ - [spq@ncaa.na](mailto:spq@ncaa.na) or phone +264 83 235 2468.

## LOSS OF SEPARATION IN FYWB TMA (MANDATORY, MEDIUM RISK, ANSSO/OPS)

Following two incidents of loss of separation in October, an operational safety meeting was held with the concerned operators, inclusive of aircraft and helicopter, non-scheduled and scheduled operators. The results of the meeting were a better understanding between ATS and pilots in the FYWB surrounds.

Action points resulting from the meeting included:

- VFR traffic should contact WBV earlier to ensure they can programme the waypoints and/or pre-programme the expected waypoints. WBV can be programmed in advance in order to be ready to route outside 15nm if required. Requests for VFR routes should be made when applicable.
- ATS are to use downwind or overhead if suitable, particularly when the alternative routing is from West to 15nm East and avoid using West routing that takes aircraft outside of gliding distance, noting particularly that gliding distance for helicopters is very limited. Refresher training will be provided for standardisation.
- NCAA will develop some guidance material.
- A coastal operator's platform will be engaged for discussion of issues in uncontrolled airspace among other items.

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# INTERNATIONAL OCCURRENCES

DECEMBER 2025

## RUNWAY INCURSION - STUDENT PILOT


On the return leg of a solo cross-country flight, a student pilot was cleared to taxi to the holding point for departure. The student pilot called "ready for takeoff" whereupon the controller told the student pilot to hold position. The student's readback was unintelligible but not corrected by the controller. Subsequently the controller spoke to a local inbound A320 in his native tongue, which the student did not understand - making them unaware of the danger. The controller cleared the A320 to land, not checking the position of the student pilot. The pilot of the A320 alerted the controller that he could see a light aircraft on the threshold. The controller responded cleared to land. The traffic performed a go around at 200ft AGL coming dangerously close to the light aircraft.

This incident illustrates the importance of looking out for traffic as a tower controller. It also stresses the importance of "hear-back" along with readback. Standard phraseology also played a part, with the student misusing the word "takeoff". Use of foreign languages, while not prohibited by ICAO, should be avoided as far as practicable.

A contributing issue was the student pilot did not have the minimum required English language proficiency (ELP), nor was it required for student pilots under the national regulations.

ICAO Annex 1 states: Contracting States shall ensure that the privileges granted would not permit student pilots to constitute a hazard to air navigation.

While not regulatory, flight schools are strongly urged to ensure **students have Level 4 ELP prior to solo.**



# SAFETY ARTICLE

## THE PILOT-CONTROLLER RELATIONSHIP

The relationship between a pilot and a controller is a complicated one, built on mutual trust, yet it cannot afford blind reliance. Key to this is that each understands the other's limitations and abilities through brisk verbal exchanges which must be navigated on a level playing field.

A controller tucked away in his/her tower may not be aware of what weather conditions a pilot has and they may also not understand your specific performance demands. Conversely, a pilot focused on their own flight path, may not understand the full picture of the traffic the controller is managing.

Two serious safety hazards exist in the relationship:

**Steep gradient ATC to Pilot:** Pilots are taught to comply with ATC from an early stage, they are used to following instructions. This can result in a fear of speaking up or to request an alternate clearance. This often happens to junior pilots or in busy environments where the pilot doesn't want to be a bother.



## THE PILOT-CONTROLLER RELATIONSHIP

**Steep Gradient Pilot to ATC:** A second dangerous situation can occur when the pilot feels the controller is either being unnecessarily difficult, not giving them the most efficient clearance, or causing what they see as undue delay. This can prompt the pilot to demand a different clearance and in trying to help the controller can be bullied into complying while compromising safety or delaying other traffic.

In both cases, human factors, perceptions, biases, personalities, verbal communication workload all play crucial pieces of the jigsaw.



**Remedy:** Pilots should not be afraid to speak up, particularly where there is a performance, weather, or terrain situation that the controller may not be aware of. Helpful requests for an alternative are recommended. However, pilots should also not demand a routing that ATC has advised cannot be provided. Respect that there are always reasons - ATC is trained to provide a safe and efficient service and will not intentionally delay you. ATC must respect a pilot who cannot comply for a valid reason - performance, terrain, weather, for example, but again conversely should never compromise safety to meet with a pilot's request.

Regular pilot-ATC forums are highly encouraged to help break down the barriers and ensure a level playing field. One such example in Windhoek is the Inter-Operator Safety Group, a forum held quarterly to address operational safety issues where ATC often join the discussion. If you need any further information on this or other content in this article, contact [spg@ncaa.na](mailto:spg@ncaa.na).

## THE PILOT-CONTROLLER RELATIONSHIP

### Hazards and Incidents Reported

**PAPIs:** The pilot of a scheduled flight reported they had to fly an unstable approach at night because the PAPIs (precision approach path indicators) were off. A steep gradient prevented the pilot from asking the tower for the reason. There had been a recent runway change and the opposite direction lights had inadvertently been left on.

**VFR Approaching the Ridge:** On three occasions, VFR pilots complained about being cleared to approach the Auas mountains in gusty conditions, compromising safety margins. The controller reported in each case, they were not aware of the strong winds nor aircraft performance (for example, to turn well inside the ridge, or not to extend too far downwind at 6500ft at FYWE). Pilots did not make their needs clear in time to avoid painting themselves into a corner.

**Unreasonable Demands:** A jet aircraft insisted on runway 26 at FYWH (Windhoek International), while there was departing traffic on runway 08, which the wind also favoured. The pilot was told 26 was not available, more than once. Eventually, they landed runway 08, however contacted Approach after landing on frequency to argue as to why runway 26 was not available. While there is station standing instructions (SSIs) stating that simultaneous use of opposite vectors is not permitted, the controller may think twice about bending this rule next time. The investigator recommended that a safety meeting be held between the operator and the ATC to iron out misunderstandings like this one.

The more we communicate, the better understanding we will both have, and remember: keep the playing field level.



## ANGELINE SIMANA

As we turn the page to a new year, many of us in the Namibia Civil Aviation Authority family are still coming to terms with the loss of Ms. Angeline Simana, who left us far too soon on 30 November 2025 after a short illness. It's hard to put into words what she meant to so many of us, colleagues, mentees, and friends alike. Her passing leaves a quiet gap, but her spirit and achievements continue to light the way for safer skies in Namibia and across Africa.

Angeline was more than a leader; she was a pioneer, a devoted mother, a gentle mentor, and one of those rare strong women who led with grace and determination in a world that wasn't always easy for women to navigate.

Many of us remember how Angeline started out at the Ministry of Works and Transport, climbing the ranks to become Director of the Directorate of Civil Aviation. She knew the challenges of our young aviation sector inside out. Then came the big change, the birth of the NCAA in 2016. As its first Executive Director, she guided us through that uncertain transition from a government directorate to an independent authority. It wasn't always smooth, but with her steady hand and clear vision, we built strong foundations: better safety oversight, closer alignment with ICAO standards, and a culture of professionalism that we're all proud of today. Namibia's excellent safety record owes so much to the groundwork she laid.

Angeline didn't stop at our borders. When she moved to the African Civil Aviation Commission in 2019 as Director of Air Transport, serving right up to June last year, she brought that same dedication to the whole continent. She even stepped in as Interim Secretary General in 2022, holding things together during a tough time. Her passion was for safer, more connected African skies: pushing for harmonised policies, better cooperation, and the kind of resilience that helps us all recover and grow. She truly believed aviation could lift Africa higher.

# MEMORIAL

## ANGELINE SIMANA

What is most memorable about Angeline is her human side. She was an incredible mentor, always taking time to listen, to encourage, especially the younger ones and women coming up in aviation. She'd share stories with a warm smile, offering advice that felt like it came from a big sister rather than a boss. And as a mother, she balanced it all with such poise, reminding us that strength doesn't mean being tough all the time; it means caring deeply and showing up, day after day.

As we start this new year, Angeline's legacy feels like a quiet encouragement to keep doing our best, for safety, for each other, for the future she helped shape. We'll honor her by living those values she held dear: integrity, cooperation, and a genuine commitment to making aviation better.

From all of us at the NCAA, our heartfelt condolences go out to her family, her friends, and everyone whose life she touched so profoundly.

Rest in peace, Angeline. Your legacy keeps soaring with us.



## HIRM

NCAA again, invites all stakeholders to keep a lookout and report any hazardous observation, attitudes, or precursor events. The more awareness of hazards the better our system moves from reactive to predictive. **Together we can make the skies safer!** And don't forget you can report online or via email.

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## Updates

Continuing with the momentum of the NASSC of 2024 and the series of workshops held in 2025, NCAA is investigating the option of another coastal workshop in 2026 along with an industry partnered workshop in Windhoek. Those wishing to assist in these ventures contact SSPQ.

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## Invitation to Contribute

Service providers and users are invited to contribute topics, ideas, articles, or questions to NCAA SPQ department for consideration in our safety publications or safety workshops. Remember the safety system only works with participation and information sharing is key to continuous improvement and achieving our global aviation safety goals.

Further information requests, submissions, or queries can be sent to:

email: [spq@ncaa.na](mailto:spq@ncaa.na)

phone: +264 83 235 2468



# GLOSSARY

Term / Acronym	Meaning / Description	Term / Acronym	Meaning / Description
A-MET	Aviation Meteorological Services – aviation weather services.	NAMCAR	Namibian Civil Aviation Regulations – the core aviation law in Namibia.
AGA	Aerodromes and Ground Aids – department responsible for the safety of airport infrastructure.	NTCA	Non-Type Certified Aircraft – aircraft not holding a type certificate under ICAO Annex 8.
AIP	Aeronautical Information Publication – a document published to provide information essential to air navigation.	OCC	Operations Control Centre – typically responsible for dispatch and operational control.
AMO	Approved Maintenance Organisation – a facility authorised by NCAA to perform aircraft maintenance.	OPS	Flight Operations Section – department overseeing flight safety, compliance, and investigations.
ANSSO	Air Navigation Services and Safety Oversight – refers to the department responsible for oversight of air navigation services.	PRAM	Person Responsible Aircraft Maintenance – a post holder designated for an AOC to address maintenance matters
AOC	Air Operator Certificate – certification issued by NCAA to an air transport operator allowing it to operate commercial air services.	QMS	Quality Management System – a structured system for quality assurance and continuous improvement.
ATO	Approved Training Organisation – an entity authorised by NCAA to conduct aviation personnel training for licenses or certificates.	RPAS	Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems – pilotless aircraft, including model aircraft and those commonly referred to as drones.
ATS	Air Traffic Services – includes services such as air traffic control (ATC), flight information, and alerting services.	SDCPS	Safety Data Collection and Processing System – structured data management tool to support SMS and SSP.
AVSEC	Aviation Security – the part of aviation concerned with preventing unlawful interference or acts of sabotage.	SMS	Safety Management System – a systematic approach to managing safety, including organizational structures and procedures.
CARTAP	Civil Aviation Regulations Technical Advisory Panel – A committee convened in terms of Part 11 to review regulations and technical standards	SPI	Safety Performance Indicator – a data-driven metric used to monitor safety performance.
CHT	Cylinder Head Temperature – the temperature at the top portion of a piston engine cylinder	SPT	Safety Performance Target – a specific safety goal to be achieved.
CNS	Communication, Navigation, Surveillance – essential infrastructure for air traffic management.	SRA	Special Rules Area – a designated airspace with additional rules or procedures applied additional to the standard rules of the air.
Doc 9859	ICAO Safety Management Manual – foundational guidance for States and service providers on SMS and SSP	SSP	State Safety Programme – the national programme for managing aviation safety.
HIRM	Hazard Identification and Risk Management – a proactive safety management approach.	TWG	Technical Working Group – an expert team working under the SSP to analyse safety data.
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization – UN body that sets global aviation standards.	UTC	Universal Coordinated Time – standard aviation time reference. sometimes referred to as GMT or Z
MEFT	Ministry of Environment, Forestry and Tourism – required for approvals in protected areas.	WHV	Hosea Kutako International Airport VOR
NAMCATS	Namibian Civil Aviation Technical Standards – technical regulatory requirements in Namibia.		