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OCTOBER  
2025

# Safety MATTERS

Providing the Namibian aviation industry and users with vital information on the latest aviation safety statistics and reports for the continuous improvement of safety systems:

Share Knowledge = Improve Safety



[www.ncaa.com.na](http://www.ncaa.com.na)



This monthly publication keeps industry, NCAA licence holders, and the general public informed of safety-related occurrences, recommendations, and initiatives within the industry. All reports are de-identified and no attempt should be made to identify the reporter in this or any other avenue unless specific authorisation is given.

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Safety data trending is essential in aviation safety. Only with adequate data on proactive and reactive mechanisms, can we move towards prediction. By analysing key events and processes through appropriate metrics, we can move closer to achieving maximum safety levels and minimising undesirable events.

## October 2025

There were 62 occurrence reports in October, including:







- 17 mandatory events, and of the 45 voluntary reports, including 6 hazards (1.3 events per 1000 movements) - showing a maturity of the system. The running total is 29.1% voluntary, 9.9% hazard, 61.1% mandatory.
- 12 medium-risk events and one high-risk event, resulting in 2.4% high risk, 19.4% medium risk, 78.3% low risk.
- There were two accidents, a forced landing after experiencing severe downdrafts at low level and an engine failure resulting in landing on soft dunes (see page 14 for more detail).



Detailed information is available in the occurrence section, and trends will be reviewed by the State Safety Programme Steering Committee (SSP Steercom) and the SSP Technical Working Group (TWG)

For more about classifications of risk see the definitions in Safety Bulletin 1-22. Graphs included in this document show 12 month rolling figures unless specified.

# Safety Statistics



# Safety Dashboard

## Safety Performance Indicators October 2025

There were two loss-of-separation events, both in Walvis Bay, one LOC-I event, and yet another two runway incursions, continuing a concerning trend (see page 13). All other categories remained below target.

Solutions to the loss of separation (promotion of better utilisation of VFR routes) and runway incursions (a more focused ground radio license for vehicle drivers and tow operators) are in the planning stage.

	AirProx/LOS	CFIT	Rwy Excurs.	Wildlife	LOCI	Rwy Incurs.	Maint & Tech
12 mth avg	0.334	0.105	0.078	1.447	0.165	0.116	2.069
JAN '25	0.000	0.255	0.000	1.533	0.000	0.000	1.277
FEB '25	0.000	0.276	0.276	1.104	0.828	0.276	1.380
MAR '25	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.505	0.000	0.000	5.767
APR '25	0.455	0.000	0.000	2.956	0.000	0.000	1.819
MAY '25	0.689	0.000	0.230	1.377	0.459	0.000	1.377
JUN '25	0.718	0.000	0.000	1.196	0.000	0.239	1.914
JUL '25	0.228	0.000	0.000	0.913	0.000	0.000	1.825
AUG '24	0.436	0.218	0.000	1.307	0.000	0.218	1.960
SEP '25	0.223	0.000	0.223	0.893	0.223	0.223	1.117
OCT '25	0.430	0.000	0.000	0.645	0.215	0.430	1.934
NOV '24	0.830	0.000	0.207	3.941	0.000	0.000	1.659
DEC '24	0.000	0.509	0.000	0.000	0.254	0.000	2.799
Target 2025	0.248	0.123	0.111	1.454	0.099	0.112	1.958
Avg 2024	0.269	0.116	0.148	1.151	0.038	0.018	2.823
SD 2024	0.295	0.201	0.167	1.043	0.086	0.060	1.318
Alert 3	0.564	0.317	0.314	2.195	0.125	0.078	4.141
Alert 2	0.860	0.518	0.481	3.238	0.211	0.137	5.459
Alert 1	1.155	0.720	0.647	4.282	0.298	0.197	6.777



### Safety Thought for the Month

*"I don't mind flying in conditions that make me earn my pay, but I flatly refuse to fly in situations that may prevent me spending it."*

- Anon

*Stay Safe!*

# Reporting

**From the ED's Desk:**

*Toska Sem*  
Executive Director



Dear Stakeholders,

October has been a month of significant progress for the Namibian civil aviation sector, marked by strengthened partnerships, renewed strategic focus, and an important milestone for our Authority on the global stage.

I am honoured to share that during the recent ICAO Assembly, I was elected as the Vice-Chair of the Technical Commission. This recognition is not a personal achievement alone, but a reflection of Namibia's growing leadership in international aviation. It affirms the confidence the global community has in our efforts to enhance safety, regulatory robustness, and technical innovation across the sector. Namibia will continue to contribute constructively to ICAO's work, ensuring that the perspectives of developing and emerging aviation markets are represented in shaping the future of global aviation standards.

Locally, the NCAA has intensified its oversight activities, continued to support operators in strengthening Safety Management Systems, and advanced our digital transformation agenda, including an agreement for cooperation with EMPIC, our digital platform provider. The ISBP was presented by the NCAA board, to the Minister of Works and Transport, Hon Veikko Nekundi, paving the way for success and efficiency. Engagement with industry stakeholders remains a key priority, and I thank all partners for their collaboration during this busy quarter.

As we enter the final months of the year, our focus remains clear: to uphold the highest levels of safety, enhance regulatory efficiency, and position Namibia as a respected and competitive aviation hub in the region.

Together, we continue to move the industry forward.

Yours in safety, Ms. Toska Sem



# MEASURING SAFETY CULTURE

Safety culture in aviation reflects the shared values, beliefs, and behaviours that determine how safety is managed and prioritised. Measuring safety culture helps identify strengths, weaknesses, and areas needing improvement—both within organisations and across the wider industry. And while a difficult task due to the subjectivity, there are things that can be done to ensure you are on the right track.



Internally, aviation organisations assess safety culture through surveys, meetings, interviews, and safety audits. Tools such as confidential employee questionnaires and Safety Management System (SMS) performance indicators reveal attitudes toward reporting, management commitment, and risk awareness. Regular analysis of safety reports, human factors data, and operational feedback provides further insight into whether staff feel empowered to report issues without fear of blame.

From the regulator’s perspective, measuring safety culture ensures compliance and continuous improvement at a national level. The main tools for the regulator are **ad-hoc and oversight audits, SMS evaluations, and safety performance indicators**. They look for evidence of a “just culture,” effective safety reporting, and proactive risk management. Regular surveys also provide valuable insight.

Safety culture, according to the FAA, involves five key facets or cultures: **A learning culture, reporting culture, just culture, informed culture, and adaptable culture**. Each of these aspects shall be reviewed and incorporated into surveys, interviews, and audits.

Ultimately, strong safety culture measurement—both internally and by regulators—creates a transparent environment where safety is continuously enhanced. It bridges the gap between compliance and genuine commitment, ensuring aviation operations remain resilient, learning-oriented, and adaptable to existing and emerging safety challenges.

Regular measurement combats subjectivity, evens out opinion, and helps us with CANI - constant and never-ending improvement.

Finally, as always, remember, for incident and hazard reporting, email to both [incidents@ncaa.na](mailto:incidents@ncaa.na) and [daaii@mwt.gov.na](mailto:daaii@mwt.gov.na); for voluntary or anonymous reports, follow the [Confidential Reporting Link](#).



# SAFETY OCCURRENCES

OCTOBER 2025



## WILDLIFE STRIKES (VOLUNTARY, MEDIUM RISK, AGA)

There were only two wildlife events reported this month. It is important to note that birdstrikes were included on the mandatory reporting list on the latest promulgation of Part 140.

Wildlife	Events and near misses		
No.	AD	Phase	Details
1	FYWE	Approach	Bird unknown
1	FYWE-FYWH	Enroute	Bird unknown
1	FYSQ	Landing	Springbok

The table below shows rates of bird and wildlife reports per 1000 movements.

YEAR	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUNE	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
2025	1.533	1.104	1.505	2.956	1.148	0.957	0.913	1.377	0.447	0.645			54
2024	2.042	3.941	0.000	1.615	1.106	0.599	1.799	1.131	0.464	0.431	3.941	0.000	67
2023	1.346	0.823	1.398	0.696	0.623	0.966	0.471	0.438	0.525	1.192	1.116	0.500	42
2022	0.846	0.739	1.126	1.272	1.308	2.350	1.877	0.219	0.250	0.679	0.684	1.925	50
2021	2.864	7.380	8.123	2.052	3.745	4.223	0.000	2.778	0.000	1.855	0.835	0.000	74

# SAFETY OCCURRENCES

OCTOBER 2025



## TECHNICAL FAULTS (MANDATORY, **LOW RISK**, AIR/OPS)

There were eight maintenance events reported this month, including one engine failure, detailed on page 14.

No.	Fault	Type
1	Electrical failure	Piston
1	Tyre burst	Turbine
1	Engine failure (see page 14)	Piston
1	Flap failure	Piston
1	Fuel gauge failure	Piston
1	Torque gauge failure	Turbine
1	Gear fault	Piston
1	Weather radar fault	Turbine

AMO personnel are again reminded of the critical importance of the elements in NAMCATS Part 140 Appendix A, as identification of trends that an individual AMO may not pick up, and it provides closure to the trends. AMOs, ATOs, AOCs, always ensure to submit the closure report from the AMO when there is a technical event, either via the PRAM or directly from the AMO.

# SAFETY OCCURRENCES

OCTOBER 2025



## ATS / A-MET RELATED EVENTS (MANDATORY, **LOW RISK**, ANSSO)

The following 18 Air Traffic Services and Meteorological events occurred.

No.	Fault	Area
4	No MET officer	FYOA, FYWB
4	Telephone lines unserviceable	FYWH, FYOA, FYKM
1	VSAT, AFTN, AIDC unserviceable	FYWF
3	Radar fault	FYWF
2	Met equipment failure	FYWB, FYWF
1	CCTV failure (cameras for manoeuvring area)	FYOA
3	Power failures	FYLZ, FYKM

Work is ongoing with Namibia Meteorological Services to improve services.

A training plan for reinstatement of procedural ratings is in progress to provide a suitable contingency plan for radar failure, while a procurement for a new system is also underway.

Remember, reports are essential for trending, so do ensure they are submitted!

# SAFETY OCCURRENCES

OCTOBER 2025



## AERODROME RELATED EVENTS (HAZARD, **LOW RISK**, AGA)

A hazard report was raised as to the use of the frequency 123.5 at Mokuti, whereupon there are a large number of aerodromes close by which are operating on 124.8.

There were two options considered, adoption of a special rules area (SRA) for the Etosha area similar to the Namib Naukluft Desert SRA or reversion of operations to 124.8 to ensure traffic is not frequency separated. See details of the event on page 15.

*NCAA is looking into this matter in conjunction with industry.*

A blue banner for airport security. On the left, there are two circular images showing airport staff in high-visibility vests. The text reads "Airport Security We ALL Contribute" and "See it. Hear it. Report it." Below this is a QR code and the NCAA logo. At the bottom, there are icons for phone, email, website, Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn.

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See it. Hear it. Report it.

NCAA

# SAFETY OCCURRENCES

OCTOBER 2025



## GO AROUNDS AND DIVERSION EVENTS (VOLUNTARY, **LOW RISK**, OPS/ANSSO)

The following table shows go-around and diversion events.

No.	Details	Intended
1	Go around due to unstable approach	FYWE
3	Go arounds due to windshear	FYWH
4	Go arounds due to traffic - no parallel ops	FYWH
2	Go arounds due to weather	FYWE
1	Go around due to traffic	FYWB
1	Diversion due to weather	FYMW
1	Diversion due to outside hours of duty (HOD)	FYWB

ATS is looking into solutions for the parallel operations issue at FYWH. One option is for a recommended no-use period, so that VFR traffic coming for pick-up can plan to leave a little earlier or later. Consultation with industry will be conducted and a safety case for stop and hold short operations. See also page 17.

# SAFETY OCCURRENCES

OCTOBER 2025

## RUNWAY INCURSION (MANDATORY, MEDIUM RISK, AGA/AVSEC)

A vehicle entered the runway at FYWH via intersection Charlie and proceeded towards the threshold of runway 08. ATC activated the crash alarm and informed ARFF of unauthorised runway entry. ARFF intercepted and escorted the vehicle out of airside.

*An investigation is underway.*



## RUNWAY INCURSION (MANDATORY, MEDIUM RISK, OPS)

During a period of unmanned operations at FYWB (as per NOTAM), a foreign-registered jet lined up on runway 09 at FYWB, while a second aircraft called on final approach 27. The aircraft on final proceeded to land while the opposite direction traffic remained on the opposite threshold.

*DAAll is investigating.*

# SAFETY OCCURRENCES

OCTOBER 2025

## ENGINE FAILURE (ACCIDENT, MEDIUM RISK, AIR)

On a scenic flight in the Sossusvlei area, a pilot experienced a loud sound and engine vibrations; there was oil on the cowls, and attempts to regain power were unsuccessful. The pilot gave a Mayday call and aircraft in the vicinity picked up his position and relayed the message.

Being relatively low level, the pilot elected to focus on the landing, closing the mixture and throttle, switching off the magnetos and master. The aircraft was still inland and the only option was landing on the dunes. With a fixed undercarriage, the probability of the wheels digging in and tipping the aircraft over was almost inevitable, and following a light touch down, the main wheels dug in, the nosewheel broke off, and the aircraft flipped on its roof.

*Always be prepared for the worst; engine failures, although rare, can happen at any time. The pilot is commended for evacuating the passengers with only minor injuries.*

## SEVERE WEATHER (ACCIDENT, MEDIUM RISK, OPS)

While conducting a low-level game-count flight in a mountain valley, the pilot encountered a strong downdraft and was unable to maintain altitude.

The pilot attempted an emergency landing in an open clearing, but the main rotor blades struck a tree, causing the helicopter to pitch forward and roll onto its side. All occupants were safely evacuated with only minor injuries. The aircraft sustained significant damage and was deemed a total loss.

*Low-level operations will come with an inherent risk. Always be prepared and look out for adverse conditions, especially around mountains. The pilot is commended for evacuating the passengers with only minor injuries.*

# SAFETY OCCURRENCES

OCTOBER 2025



## LOSS OF SEPARATION (MANDATORY, MEDIUM RISK, OPS/ANSSO)

On two separate occasions, there was an event of loss of separation in FYWB between a VFR aircraft crossing the TMA North to South East and an IFR aircraft on final runway 27.

*Both pilots and ATC are reminded of the importance of VFR routes in the FYWB TMA to avoid traffic conflict, in these cases the use of VFR route 4 would have likely avoided conflict. Pilots should ensure the waypoints are programmed prior to departure. Further if asked to remain outside a fixed distance, it is essential to programme WBV into the GPS (or DME) to ensure the distance is maintained; guessimates are not acceptable for separation.*

## LOSS OF SEPARATION (MANDATORY, MEDIUM RISK, OPS/ANSSO)

There were three reports of no radio calls from VFR traffic in unmanned airspace causing a loss of separation.

*In one case it is possible that the traffic was frequency separated, operating from FYMO with 123.5 whereas the other traffic was on 124.8 operating into FYGG, in close proximity.*

*Pilots are reminded of the critical importance of hear and be heard as well as see and be seen in unmanned airspace. Visual acuity is very limited and the extra layer of protection is crucial.*

# SAFETY OCCURRENCES

OCTOBER 2025

## ILLEGAL DRONE OPERATIONS (MANDATORY, **LOW RISK**, OPS)

A confidential report about illegal drone operations was received after the loss of a drone in flight.

*OPS is investigating.*

## UNMARKED POWERLINES (HAZARD, **MEDIUM RISK**, OPS)

A hazard report was received about unmarked NamPower lines crossing the new Eastern highway in between FYWE and FYWH. The matter was notified both to NamPower and to NCAA.

*NamPower is investigating.*



## ENGINE SWAP (MANDATORY, **MEDIUM RISK**, OPS/AIR)

A confidential report about a possible non-compliant engine change was received (the manufacturer's procedures were not followed).

*OPS and AIR are investigating.*

# SAFETY OCCURRENCES

OCTOBER 2025



## PARALLEL OPERATIONS AT FYWH (VOLUNTARY, **LOW RISK**, ANSSO/OPS)

Two VFR aircraft into FYWH during peak time experienced what they considered unnecessary delays.

In one case the aircraft was asked to orbit left on a left downwind, very unusual, and putting the aircraft over the runway, whereupon extending slightly would have worked equally well and been more comfortable for passengers.

In a second event a go around and lengthy re-route occurred due to medium traffic vacating the taxiway, whereupon slowing down earlier could have also prevented significant unnecessary extra costs.

*The prevention of simultaneous movements at Windhoek causes considerable problems for ATC and pilots, notably if an aircraft does not vacate as planned there is a +/-10-minute longer taxi (+/-15 minutes total), whereupon no aircraft can takeoff or land.*

# SAFETY OCCURRENCES

OCTOBER 2025



## UNCALIBRATED SCALES (VOLUNTARY, **LOW RISK**, AGA)

The scales at a number of domestic aerodromes had an expired passenger baggage scale calibration certificate.

*The operator contacted the aerodrome and a short-term CAP was put in place to get the scales calibrated, along with a long-term CAP for a quality procedure to ensure it does not recur.*

## POWER FAILURE (VOLUNTARY, **LOW RISK**, AGA)

A power failure at FYWH caused a significant delay with screening.

*Investigation into why standby power was not available is underway.*



# *Take Care* **ON RUNWAYS** Look-out and Listen-out

**Runway safety is everyone's responsibility. We should all be vigilant when approaching a runway. Listen out to other traffic and vehicles. Look out for other traffic and vehicles. Make sure you have a clearance.**



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[SPQ@NCAA.COM.NA](mailto:SPQ@NCAA.COM.NA)  
083 235 2100



# SAFETY FEEDBACK

OCTOBER 2025

## AIRPORT REGISTRATION

Following the successful promulgation of the much-debated Part 139 Subpart 5, AGA informed industry that a portal will be available for streamlined aerodrome registration online, assisting industry to comply with the new regulations.

Unfortunately, due to delays in the promulgation of Part 187 and IT constraints, the portal remains unavailable; however, this does not mean that registration is not possible.


Aerodrome owners are urged to register their aerodromes on form FSS-AGA-FORM-035A with [AGA@ncaa.na](mailto:AGA@ncaa.na). Registration will assist in the identification of duplicate and permanently closed runways, a process that is currently underway via existing data and satellite imagery.

A request has additionally been made to publish registered aerodromes with coordinates in an AIC to assist in the confirmation of correct coordinates. It was noted that the AIC should clearly indicate that the publication does not indicate permission and aerodrome operators should be contacted in advance to confirm permissions.



# SAFETY FEEDBACK

OCTOBER 2025



## VFR ROUTES TRANSITING FYWB AIRSPACE

There were two occurrences of conflict with VFR traffic transiting FYWB airspace enroute to the Sossusvlei area and IFR traffic on final approach.

The initial investigation highlighted the importance of utilising VFR routes to ensure adequate separation and avoid guesswork by the VFR pilots.

Operators are advised to ensure VFR waypoints as per the AIP are programmed in advance for FYWB. ATS have been briefed to utilise the VFR routes for avoiding conflict and pilots may also request the routing where they feel doubt exists.

See further on page 15.

# INTERNATIONAL OCCURRENCES


OCTOBER 2025

## FUEL GASKET - AGING COMPONENTS

In an investigation report released in October, a successful forced landing was carried out following a fault in the fuel system.

The aircraft had been flying for about 35 minutes when the pilot noticed a slight engine vibration. This was rapidly followed by a power loss. The pilot noted a distinct smell of fuel in the cockpit and suspected a fuel problem. He briefed his passenger and established a stable glide descent to carry out a wheels-up forced landing in a field. The aircraft landed on its underside and came to a stop. The passenger suffered minor injuries and the pilot was uninjured.

The power loss was caused by the failure, probably age related, of a gasket, fitted within the pressure switch for the fuel low pressure warning light, which is attached to the carburettor. This allowed pressurised fuel to spray into the lower rear part of the engine bay, above and into, the air filter box. The fuel was then drawn into the air flow affecting the fuel air mixture, so the engine was running extremely rich. This resulted in the engine vibration and subsequent power loss.



# INTERNATIONAL OCCURRENCES

OCTOBER 2025

## FUEL GASKET - AGING COMPONENTS

Prioritising the need to fly the aircraft and, faced with a high workload, he asked the pilot in the accompanying aircraft to carry out the radio communications. This allowed him to concentrate more fully on the forced landing. He also noted that his passenger, who was an experienced professional commercial pilot, remained calm throughout.

Reflecting on the forced landing, the pilot considered factors which had contributed to the successful outcome. These included being mindful of height in the cruise, to provide more time for decision making in the event of an emergency and avoiding overflying built up areas in a single engine aircraft. He described the benefits of performing practice forced landings on a regular basis. This was something he routinely did and also emphasised to students in his role as a flying instructor/class rating instructor.

Takeaway: **Always prioritise "fly the aircraft"!**

The responsible CAA found that similar types of pressure switch, with various part numbers and modification states, were used in the fuel and hydraulic systems of various piston and gas turbine powered aircraft from the 1940's to the 1980's. Many such aircraft are still in operation. As a result of this occurrence, the CAA issued Safety Notice (SN) [SN-2025-009](#). The SN informs historic aircraft operators and maintenance organisations of the **importance of proactive monitoring and maintaining the airworthiness of ageing tertiary fuel and hydraulic system switches and similar components**. It emphasises the need to have procedures in place to identify components that may be affected by age degradation or extended use and to ensure that the aircraft maintenance programme includes provisions for regular inspection, periodic operational and functional checks, and calendar life limits, for such components.

Takeaway: **Preventative maintenance is key in aging fleets.**

## UNDECLARED DANGEROUS GOODS



Despite stringent regulations, undeclared dangerous goods continue to appear in aircraft cargo holds. These shipments pose significant fire risks and it is essential to reinforce this message, particularly with the rise of common-use items with lithium-ion batteries.

### Key Dangerous Goods Fire Risks

- Undeclared Shipments: Goods not properly declared, packaged, or handled according to ICAO Technical Instructions pose the greatest risk. Shippers sometimes mislabel or fail to identify hazardous materials to avoid regulations.
- Lithium Batteries: These are a major concern due to their potential for thermal runaway, which can create high-energy fires that are difficult to extinguish with conventional aircraft systems.
- Spontaneous Combustion: Certain items like wet cargo (e.g., some types of fishmeal, seed cake, or chlorine tablets under high humidity) can self-heat and ignite a fire without an external ignition source.
- Inadequately Packed Goods: Even permitted dangerous goods can cause fires if not packed correctly, such as a short-circuit in an unprotected spare battery or a leak from an improperly sealed container.

## UNDECLARED DANGEROUS GOODS

### Noteworthy Incidents and Accidents:

- Asiana B747-400F (2011): An in-flight fire attributed to a combination of lithium-ion batteries and flammable substances on two adjacent pallets led to the aircraft's crash into the sea. The fire escalated rapidly and overwhelmed the crew.
- UPS B747-400F (2010): A main deck cargo fire caused by the auto-ignition of undeclared dangerous goods led to the loss of control and crash of the aircraft. The rapid build-up of smoke on the flight deck made control impossible.
- B77L, Shanghai (2020): A fire on the ground was caused by the spontaneous ignition of a shipment of undeclared chlorine disinfection tablets. The fire took almost three hours to extinguish, highlighting the challenges posed by certain materials.

### Mitigating the Risk

- **Awareness and Training:** Raising awareness among all stakeholders, including shippers and passengers, about the severe consequences of transporting hidden dangerous goods is crucial.
- **Adherence to Regulations:** Strict compliance with the ICAO Technical Instructions for the Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air is essential.
- **Effective Screening:** Rigorous security screening helps to detect hidden dangerous goods, though some occasionally evade detection.
- **Robust Systems:** Aircraft cargo holds are designed with fire detection and suppression systems (e.g., using Halon) and fire-proof lining to contain fires, though some dangerous goods fires can overwhelm these systems.
- **Incident Reporting:** Prompt reporting of occurrences involving hidden dangerous goods is vital to trigger investigations and hold responsible parties accountable.



# SAFETY ARTICLE

## UNDECLARED DANGEROUS GOODS, LITHIUM BATTERIES

IATA recently announced the launch of the “Travel Smart with Lithium Batteries” global campaign aimed at educating passengers on how to travel safely with lithium-powered devices. While most travellers carry phones, laptops, and power banks, many remain unaware of important safety rules, including that these items must **not be packed in checked baggage**.

As part of this initiative, IATA is providing airlines and other interested aviation stakeholders with a suite of digital communication materials, including:

- A short animation video designed to make the safety rules simple, engaging, and easy to remember;
- Seven individual clips derived from the main video, each highlighting one of the seven key safety rules every passenger should follow;
- A PDF summary of the rules.

All materials can be customised for your communication channels, including onboard screens, social media, and websites. We encourage you to share these assets widely across your passenger-facing platforms, such as social media, inflight entertainment systems, and websites, to help amplify this important safety message.

You can download all campaign assets [\[HERE\]](#). The IATA press release can be found [\[HERE\]](#).



# SAFETY EVENTS



## **HUMAN FACTORS WORKSHOP - 23<sup>RD</sup> OCTOBER 2025**

The NCAA welcomed over 50 participants to the Human Factors workshop, the last in a series of well-attended safety events. On this occasion, we exceeded the capacity of the cafeteria, luckily a boardroom was booked in advance for overflow.

Prospective presenters and participants for the 2026 calendar year are requested to get in touch with [spq@ncaa.na](mailto:spq@ncaa.na) with requests/proposals/offers.

## HIRM

NCAA again, invites all stakeholders to keep a look out and report any hazardous observation, attitudes, or precursor events. The more awareness of hazards the better our system moves from reactive to predictive. **Together we can make the skies safer!** And don't forget you can report online or via email.

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## Updates

- The Civil Aviation Act amendment is at an advanced stage and will begin an extensive process of public consultation soon.
  - The ICAO Global Aviation Safety Plan for 2026-2028 was endorsed by the ICAO assembly and has been published, [\[HERE\]](#). Work on the NASP to align is in progress.
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## Invitation to Contribute

Service providers and users are invited to contribute topics, ideas, articles, or questions to NCAA SPQ department for consideration in our safety publications or safety workshops. Remember the safety system only works with participation and information sharing is key to continuous improvement and achieving our global aviation safety goals.

Further information requests, submissions, or queries can be sent to:

email: [spq@ncaa.na](mailto:spq@ncaa.na)

phone: 083 235 2468



# GLOSSARY

Term / Acronym	Meaning / Description	Term / Acronym	Meaning / Description
A-MET	Aviation Meteorological Services – aviation weather services.	NAMCAR	Namibian Civil Aviation Regulations – the core aviation law in Namibia.
AGA	Aerodromes and Ground Aids – department responsible for the safety of airport infrastructure.	NTCA	Non-Type Certified Aircraft – aircraft not holding a type certificate under ICAO Annex 8.
AIP	Aeronautical Information Publication – a document published to provide information essential to air navigation.	OCC	Operations Control Centre – typically responsible for dispatch and operational control.
AMO	Approved Maintenance Organisation – a facility authorised by NCAA to perform aircraft maintenance.	OPS	Flight Operations Section – department overseeing flight safety, compliance, and investigations.
ANSSO	Air Navigation Services and Safety Oversight – refers to the department responsible for oversight of air navigation services.	PRAM	Person Responsible Aircraft Maintenance – a post holder designated for an AOC to address maintenance matters
AOC	Air Operator Certificate – certification issued by NCAA to an air transport operator allowing it to operate commercial air services.	QMS	Quality Management System – a structured system for quality assurance and continuous improvement.
ATO	Approved Training Organisation – an entity authorised by NCAA to conduct aviation personnel training for licenses or certificates.	RPAS	Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems – pilotless aircraft, including model aircraft and those commonly referred to as drones.
ATS	Air Traffic Services – includes services such as air traffic control (ATC), flight information, and alerting services.	SDCPS	Safety Data Collection and Processing System – structured data management tool to support SMS and SSP.
AVSEC	Aviation Security – the part of aviation concerned with preventing unlawful interference or acts of sabotage.	SMS	Safety Management System – a systematic approach to managing safety, including organizational structures and procedures.
CARTAP	Civil Aviation Regulations Technical Advisory Panel – A committee convened in terms of Part 11 to review regulations and technical standards	SPI	Safety Performance Indicator – a data-driven metric used to monitor safety performance.
CHT	Cylinder Head Temperature – the temperature at the top portion of a piston engine cylinder	SPT	Safety Performance Target – a specific safety goal to be achieved.
CNS	Communication, Navigation, Surveillance – essential infrastructure for air traffic management.	SRA	Special Rules Area – a designated airspace with additional rules or procedures applied additional to the standard rules of the air.
Doc 9859	ICAO Safety Management Manual – foundational guidance for States and service providers on SMS and SSP	SSP	State Safety Programme – the national programme for managing aviation safety.
HIRM	Hazard Identification and Risk Management – a proactive safety management approach.	TWG	Technical Working Group – an expert team working under the SSP to analyse safety data.
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization – UN body that sets global aviation standards.	UTC	Universal Coordinated Time – standard aviation time reference. sometimes referred to as GMT or Z
MEFT	Ministry of Environment, Forestry and Tourism – required for approvals in protected areas.	WHV	Hosea Kutako International Airport VOR
NAMCATS	Namibian Civil Aviation Technical Standards – technical regulatory requirements in Namibia.		